Research module B
Privileged Access
Who can upgrade, own, pause or administer each asset, and how that authority is held. Contracts are taken from issuers' own deployment manifests; authority is read from the chain at a stated block. Where a source could not be reached, this page says so instead of filling the gap.
- Assets
- 10
- 3 with an issuer manifest
- Documented contracts
- 17
- From issuer deployment manifests
- Verified onchain
- 0 / 80
- Authority observations read at a block
- Integration unavailable
- 80
- Authority observations not read
- Verified source
- 0 / 24
- Sourcify matches
- Held for review
- 0
- Claims of absence awaiting a reviewer
By asset
Authority, documented and verified
Each asset's onchain authority beside what the Security Controls Index found in documentation and source code. The two are reported side by side and never merged: an onchain observation does not change a control's state or a score.
Authority observations by verification state
- Integration unavailable
80 integration unavailable — of 80 authority observations across 10 assets.
| Asset | Documented contracts | Onchain authority | Controls review (documentation and code) | Details |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JTRSYCentrifuge · Ethereum | No manifest | Integration unavailable 8 | Evidence for JTRSY | |
| TBILLOpenEden · Ethereum | 7 | Integration unavailable 8 | Evidence for TBILL | |
| USTBSuperstate · Ethereum | 5 | Integration unavailable 8 | Evidence for USTB | |
| USTBLSpiko · Ethereum | 5 | Integration unavailable 8 | Evidence for USTBL | |
| OUSGOndo Finance · Ethereum | No manifest | Integration unavailable 8 | Evidence for OUSG | |
| USDYOndo Finance · Ethereum | No manifest | Integration unavailable 8 | Evidence for USDY | |
| WTGXXWisdomTree · Ethereum | No manifest | Integration unavailable 8 | Evidence for WTGXX | |
| BENJIFranklin Templeton · Polygon | No manifest | Integration unavailable 8 | Evidence for BENJI | |
| BUIDLSecuritize · Ethereum | No manifest | Integration unavailable 8 | Evidence for BUIDL | |
| USYCCircle · Ethereum | No manifest | Integration unavailable 8 | Evidence for USYC |
Data sources
What each source answered in the last run
Recorded in the run itself, with the time each integration was checked. An integration that could not be reached is reported as unavailable; nothing is filled in for it.
- Issuer repositories on GitHubAvailable
4 of 4 manifests read at pinned commits.
Checked 23 Oct 2026, 11:37 UTC
- Ethereum JSON-RPCUnavailable
JSON-RPC provider not reachable: No HTTP response: fetch failed (Request was cancelled.)
Checked 23 Oct 2026, 11:37 UTC
- Polygon PoS JSON-RPCUnavailable
JSON-RPC provider not reachable: No HTTP response: fetch failed (Request was cancelled.)
Checked 23 Oct 2026, 11:37 UTC
- SourcifyUnavailable
Not reachable: No HTTP response: fetch failed (Request was cancelled.)
Checked 23 Oct 2026, 11:37 UTC
- Safe Transaction ServiceNot configured
SAFE_API_KEY is not set, and no Safe was identified onchain to cross-check.
Checked 23 Oct 2026, 11:37 UTC
- Etherscan (v2 multichain API)Not configured
ETHERSCAN_API_KEY is not set.
Checked 23 Oct 2026, 11:37 UTC
- Ethereum JSON-RPCUnavailable
Event logs: JSON-RPC provider not reachable: No HTTP response: fetch failed (Request was cancelled.)
Checked 23 Oct 2026, 11:37 UTC
- Polygon PoS JSON-RPCUnavailable
Event logs: JSON-RPC provider not reachable: No HTTP response: fetch failed (Request was cancelled.)
Checked 23 Oct 2026, 11:37 UTC
- Issuer repositories on GitHubAvailable
Documented relationships: 27 of 27 statements found at pinned commits.
Checked 23 Oct 2026, 11:37 UTC
- SEC EDGARNot configured
SEC_USER_AGENT is not set; the SEC requires a declared User-Agent, so no filing index was requested.
Checked 23 Oct 2026, 11:37 UTC
- Chainlink data feedsNot configured
No Chainlink network feed is documented for any asset in the sources read. Issuer-operated price feeds documented in deployment manifests are read over JSON-RPC instead.
Checked 23 Oct 2026, 11:37 UTC
- RWA.xyzNot licensed
No licensed API access is configured. RWA.xyz is not called and its site is not scraped.
Checked 23 Oct 2026, 11:37 UTC
Run environment: Claude Code cloud session. Outbound network access is limited by the environment's policy: GitHub was reachable; Sourcify, public JSON-RPC providers, block explorers, the Safe Transaction Service, Chainlink, SEC EDGAR and issuer documentation sites were refused at the egress proxy when probed. No Etherscan or Safe API key was configured, and no SEC User-Agent was declared.
Data table
Documented contracts
Contracts named in each issuer's deployment manifest, read at a pinned commit with a content hash. A role is recorded where the manifest states it; otherwise the entry keeps the manifest's own name. Documented is not verified: an address here has not been read onchain unless the asset's evidence page says so.
Showing 17 of 17 documented contracts
7 assets have no issuer deployment manifest the collection could read; their only published address is the token address in the index.
Methodology
Method and limitations
What is read, and how
- Proxy implementation
- The logic contract behind the token, from the EIP-1967 implementation slot.
- Upgrade admin
- The account allowed to upgrade a transparent proxy, from the EIP-1967 admin slot.
- Owner of the upgrade admin
- Who controls the upgrade admin contract, from its owner().
- Token owner
- The token contract's owner(), where it has one.
- Multisig control
- Owners and signing threshold of a Safe found among the admin and owner accounts read.
- Timelock delay
- The minimum delay of a timelock found among the accounts read or documented for the asset.
- Pause state
- Whether the token reported itself paused at the block read.
- Role holders
- Members of each AccessControl role — including mint, burn, pause and freeze roles — reconstructed by replaying RoleGranted and RoleRevoked from deployment.
Limitations
- Holding authority is not evidence of misuse. This module records who can act, not whether anyone has.
- All reads for an asset are taken at one block and dated. Authority can change after that block; the date shown is when it was read, not now.
- Mint, burn, pause and freeze role holders are reconstructed from role-change events, collected with Security Events.
- A claim that something is absent — no Safe among the holders, no timelock, no verified source — is published only after a named researcher reviews it.
- Documented contracts come from issuer repositories. They are the issuer's statement, and are labelled as such until read onchain.
Verification states
- Verified onchain
- Read directly from contract state or event logs, at a stated chain and block.
- Verified source
- Deployed bytecode matched to published source code by a source-verification service.
- Documented
- Stated in an issuer-published source — documentation, a deployment manifest or a filing — and not independently checked onchain.
- Unverified
- Looked for; the evidence found cannot establish it either way. Not a finding, and not a failure.
- Not observed
- Looked for in a stated scope and not found there. A claim of absence, published only after research review.
- Integration unavailable
- Nothing was observed: the data source needed was unreachable or not configured when collection ran.
Open data
Downloads
The published dataset as stored, every observation as CSV, and every collection run with its ledger.
- Privileged access dataset JSONEvery published observation with its verification state, value and full provenance.
- Privileged access observations CSVOne row per observation: subject, verification, first source, run, chain and block.
- Collection runs JSONEvery run with what each integration answered, and the hash-chained ledger over the run files.
Important context
Scores measure publicly observable technical controls and documentation at the stated snapshot date. They are not smart-contract audits, credit ratings, investment recommendations, or assessments of an organization's complete security posture.