Protocol report · Q3 2026 edition

OUSGOndo Finance

Provisional — Limited Public Evidence
Issuer / protocol
Ondo Finance
Network
Ethereum
Observation date
21 Sep 2026
Dataset version
21 SEP 2026
Methodology
Q3-2026-v1.0
Cited public sources
5
Contract address
0x1B19C19393e2d034D8Ff31ff34c81252FcBbee92

Security controls breakdown

Five control categories

Each category applies the same formula to its own controls. “Not scored” means no control in the category could be resolved publicly — it is not a zero.

  1. Privileged / Admin

    100/100

    1 of 2 controls scored · 1 unresolved

    Role design, access separation, and privileged authority.

  2. Emergency / Upgrade

    100/100

    2 of 4 controls scored · 2 unresolved

    Emergency response, pause, upgradeability, upgrade authority, and timelocks.

  3. Supply / Transfer

    100/100

    2 of 2 controls scored

    Mint, burn, supply, and transfer restrictions.

  4. Asset Integrity

    100/100

    1 of 1 control scored

    Backing, custody, valuation, and reconciliation signals.

  5. Assurance / Observability

    100/100

    1 of 2 controls scored · 1 unresolved

    Audits, monitoring, disclosures, and operational visibility.

Evidence explorer

Control register and public evidence

Verified and unresolved observations are shown together to preserve the complete review scope. Unverified controls carry no evidence and are excluded from the score. This review resolved 64% of the register, below the 80% needed for a ranked position, so the score is published without one.

One block per control, in register order.VERIFIED 7UNVERIFIED 4

Privileged / Admin

100/100
  • Administrative and privileged roles are publicly identifiable in contract code or issuer documentation.

    Why this result

    Direct public evidence — contract source, a deployment manifest or a published audit — supports the control.

    Weight 3 × multiplier 1 = 3 of 3 possible points.

    Privileged / Admin · Control admin-roles

    Evidence (2)

    1. Evidence source
      Ondo OUSG - ousgInstantManager.sol as submitted for audit, with CONFIGURER, PAUSER and admin roles
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
    2. Evidence source
      Ondo OUSG - rOUSG.sol as submitted for audit, the pausable KYC-gated rebasing token
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
  • Privileged authority is held by a multi-signature account that can be proven from public sources.

    Why this result

    Available evidence is insufficient to establish either presence or absence. Excluded from numerator and denominator, and counted against evidence coverage.

    Removed from the numerator and the denominator: weight 2 does not enter the score. Counted against evidence coverage — an unresolved control is not a failed control.

    Privileged / Admin · Control admin-multisig

    Evidence

    No public evidence located for this control at the observation date.

Emergency / Upgrade

100/100
  • A pause, freeze or equivalent emergency stop over the token is observable.

    Why this result

    Direct public evidence — contract source, a deployment manifest or a published audit — supports the control.

    Weight 3 × multiplier 1 = 3 of 3 possible points.

    Emergency / Upgrade · Control emergency-pause

    Evidence (2)

    1. Evidence source
      Ondo OUSG - ousgInstantManager.sol as submitted for audit, with CONFIGURER, PAUSER and admin roles
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
    2. Evidence source
      Ondo OUSG - rOUSG.sol as submitted for audit, the pausable KYC-gated rebasing token
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
  • Whether and how the deployed contracts can be upgraded is publicly determinable.

    Why this result

    Direct public evidence — contract source, a deployment manifest or a published audit — supports the control.

    Weight 3 × multiplier 1 = 3 of 3 possible points.

    Emergency / Upgrade · Control upgrade-pattern

    Evidence (1)

    1. Evidence source
      Code4rena - Ondo Finance March 2024 audit scope, describing the OUSG proxy, KYC registry and price oracle
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
  • The account or contract authorised to perform upgrades is publicly identified.

    Why this result

    Available evidence is insufficient to establish either presence or absence. Excluded from numerator and denominator, and counted against evidence coverage.

    Removed from the numerator and the denominator: weight 3 does not enter the score. Counted against evidence coverage — an unresolved control is not a failed control.

    Emergency / Upgrade · Control upgrade-authority

    Evidence

    No public evidence located for this control at the observation date.

  • A timelock or enforced delay applies to upgrades or other privileged actions.

    Why this result

    Available evidence is insufficient to establish either presence or absence. Excluded from numerator and denominator, and counted against evidence coverage.

    Removed from the numerator and the denominator: weight 2 does not enter the score. Counted against evidence coverage — an unresolved control is not a failed control.

    Emergency / Upgrade · Control upgrade-timelock

    Evidence

    No public evidence located for this control at the observation date.

Supply / Transfer

100/100
  • Authority to mint and burn supply is restricted and publicly documented.

    Why this result

    Direct public evidence — contract source, a deployment manifest or a published audit — supports the control.

    Weight 3 × multiplier 1 = 3 of 3 possible points.

    Supply / Transfer · Control supply-mint-burn

    Evidence (2)

    1. Evidence source
      Ondo OUSG - ousgInstantManager.sol as submitted for audit, with CONFIGURER, PAUSER and admin roles
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
    2. Evidence source
      Ondo OUSG - rOUSG.sol as submitted for audit, the pausable KYC-gated rebasing token
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
  • Transfer eligibility is enforced on-chain or through a documented compliance layer.

    Why this result

    Direct public evidence — contract source, a deployment manifest or a published audit — supports the control.

    Weight 3 × multiplier 1 = 3 of 3 possible points.

    Supply / Transfer · Control supply-transfer-restrictions

    Evidence (2)

    1. Evidence source
      Code4rena - Ondo Finance March 2024 audit scope, describing the OUSG proxy, KYC registry and price oracle
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
    2. Evidence source
      Ondo OUSG - rOUSG.sol as submitted for audit, the pausable KYC-gated rebasing token
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)

Asset Integrity

100/100
  • Backing of the token and its net asset value are evidenced by published reporting or an on-chain price source.

    Why this result

    Direct public evidence — contract source, a deployment manifest or a published audit — supports the control.

    Weight 3 × multiplier 1 = 3 of 3 possible points.

    Asset Integrity · Control asset-backing-nav

    Evidence (1)

    1. Evidence source
      Code4rena - Ondo Finance March 2024 audit scope, describing the OUSG proxy, KYC registry and price oracle
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)

Assurance / Observability

100/100
  • At least one third-party security review of the deployed contract system is publicly available.

    Why this result

    Direct public evidence — contract source, a deployment manifest or a published audit — supports the control.

    Weight 3 × multiplier 1 = 3 of 3 possible points.

    Assurance / Observability · Control assurance-audits

    Evidence (2)

    1. Evidence source
      Code4rena - Ondo Finance competitive audit report, March 2024
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencecode4rena.com (opens in a new tab)
    2. Evidence source
      Ondo Finance - smart contract audit index
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      MEDIUM
      View evidencedocs.ondo.finance (opens in a new tab)
  • Ongoing monitoring, incident response or an independent controls assurance programme is evidenced.

    Why this result

    Available evidence is insufficient to establish either presence or absence. Excluded from numerator and denominator, and counted against evidence coverage.

    Removed from the numerator and the denominator: weight 2 does not enter the score. Counted against evidence coverage — an unresolved control is not a failed control.

    Assurance / Observability · Control assurance-monitoring

    Evidence

    No public evidence located for this control at the observation date.

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Important context

Scores measure publicly observable technical controls and documentation at the stated snapshot date. They are not smart-contract audits, credit ratings, investment recommendations, or assessments of an organization's complete security posture.