Protocol report · Q3 2026 edition

JTRSYCentrifuge

Ranked#01Position 1 of 4 ranked
Issuer / protocol
Centrifuge
Network
Ethereum
Observation date
21 Sep 2026
Dataset version
21 SEP 2026
Methodology
Q3-2026-v1.0
Cited public sources
11
Contract address
0x8c213ee79581Ff4984583C6a801e5263418C4b86

Security controls breakdown

Five control categories

Each category applies the same formula to its own controls. “Not scored” means no control in the category could be resolved publicly — it is not a zero.

  1. Privileged / Admin

    100/100

    2 of 2 controls scored

    Role design, access separation, and privileged authority.

  2. Emergency / Upgrade

    100/100

    4 of 4 controls scored

    Emergency response, pause, upgradeability, upgrade authority, and timelocks.

  3. Supply / Transfer

    100/100

    2 of 2 controls scored

    Mint, burn, supply, and transfer restrictions.

  4. Asset Integrity

    100/100

    1 of 1 control scored

    Backing, custody, valuation, and reconciliation signals.

  5. Assurance / Observability

    90/100

    2 of 2 controls scored

    Audits, monitoring, disclosures, and operational visibility.

Evidence explorer

Control register and public evidence

Verified and unresolved observations are shown together to preserve the complete review scope. Unverified controls carry no evidence and are excluded from the score.

One block per control, in register order.VERIFIED 10SUPPORTED BY DOCUMENTATION 1

Privileged / Admin

100/100
  • Administrative and privileged roles are publicly identifiable in contract code or issuer documentation.

    Why this result

    Direct public evidence — contract source, a deployment manifest or a published audit — supports the control.

    Weight 3 × multiplier 1 = 3 of 3 possible points.

    Privileged / Admin · Control admin-roles

    Evidence (2)

    1. Evidence source
      Centrifuge Liquidity Pools - Root.sol, the timelocked ward registry behind every pool contract
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
    2. Evidence source
      Centrifuge Liquidity Pools - Guardian.sol, which gates admin actions on a Safe multisig
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
  • Privileged authority is held by a multi-signature account that can be proven from public sources.

    Why this result

    Direct public evidence — contract source, a deployment manifest or a published audit — supports the control.

    Weight 2 × multiplier 1 = 2 of 2 possible points.

    Privileged / Admin · Control admin-multisig

    Evidence (1)

    1. Evidence source
      Centrifuge Liquidity Pools - Guardian.sol, which gates admin actions on a Safe multisig
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)

Emergency / Upgrade

100/100
  • A pause, freeze or equivalent emergency stop over the token is observable.

    Why this result

    Direct public evidence — contract source, a deployment manifest or a published audit — supports the control.

    Weight 3 × multiplier 1 = 3 of 3 possible points.

    Emergency / Upgrade · Control emergency-pause

    Evidence (2)

    1. Evidence source
      Centrifuge Liquidity Pools - Root.sol, the timelocked ward registry behind every pool contract
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
    2. Evidence source
      Centrifuge Liquidity Pools - RestrictionManager.sol, the memberlist and account-freeze hook
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
  • Whether and how the deployed contracts can be upgraded is publicly determinable.

    Why this result

    Direct public evidence — contract source, a deployment manifest or a published audit — supports the control.

    Weight 3 × multiplier 1 = 3 of 3 possible points.

    Emergency / Upgrade · Control upgrade-pattern

    Evidence (2)

    1. Evidence source
      Centrifuge Liquidity Pools - Root.sol, the timelocked ward registry behind every pool contract
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
    2. Evidence source
      Centrifuge Liquidity Pools - Tranche.sol, the ERC-20 / ERC-1404 share token
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
  • The account or contract authorised to perform upgrades is publicly identified.

    Why this result

    Direct public evidence — contract source, a deployment manifest or a published audit — supports the control.

    Weight 3 × multiplier 1 = 3 of 3 possible points.

    Emergency / Upgrade · Control upgrade-authority

    Evidence (2)

    1. Evidence source
      Centrifuge Liquidity Pools - Guardian.sol, which gates admin actions on a Safe multisig
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
    2. Evidence source
      Centrifuge Liquidity Pools - Root.sol, the timelocked ward registry behind every pool contract
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
  • A timelock or enforced delay applies to upgrades or other privileged actions.

    Why this result

    Direct public evidence — contract source, a deployment manifest or a published audit — supports the control.

    Weight 2 × multiplier 1 = 2 of 2 possible points.

    Emergency / Upgrade · Control upgrade-timelock

    Evidence (1)

    1. Evidence source
      Centrifuge Liquidity Pools - Root.sol, the timelocked ward registry behind every pool contract
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)

Supply / Transfer

100/100
  • Authority to mint and burn supply is restricted and publicly documented.

    Why this result

    Direct public evidence — contract source, a deployment manifest or a published audit — supports the control.

    Weight 3 × multiplier 1 = 3 of 3 possible points.

    Supply / Transfer · Control supply-mint-burn

    Evidence (2)

    1. Evidence source
      Centrifuge Liquidity Pools - ERC20.sol, whose mint and burn are ward-gated
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
    2. Evidence source
      Centrifuge Liquidity Pools - Tranche.sol, the ERC-20 / ERC-1404 share token
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
  • Transfer eligibility is enforced on-chain or through a documented compliance layer.

    Why this result

    Direct public evidence — contract source, a deployment manifest or a published audit — supports the control.

    Weight 3 × multiplier 1 = 3 of 3 possible points.

    Supply / Transfer · Control supply-transfer-restrictions

    Evidence (2)

    1. Evidence source
      Centrifuge Liquidity Pools - Tranche.sol, the ERC-20 / ERC-1404 share token
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
    2. Evidence source
      Centrifuge Liquidity Pools - RestrictionManager.sol, the memberlist and account-freeze hook
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)

Asset Integrity

100/100
  • Backing of the token and its net asset value are evidenced by published reporting or an on-chain price source.

    Why this result

    Direct public evidence — contract source, a deployment manifest or a published audit — supports the control.

    Weight 3 × multiplier 1 = 3 of 3 possible points.

    Asset Integrity · Control asset-backing-nav

    Evidence (2)

    1. Evidence source
      Centrifuge Liquidity Pools - PoolManager.sol, which records monotonic on-chain tranche prices with a computedAt timestamp
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
    2. Evidence source
      Anemoy - Janus Henderson Anemoy Treasury Fund (JTRSY) fund page
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      MEDIUM
      View evidenceanemoy.io (opens in a new tab)

Assurance / Observability

90/100
  • At least one third-party security review of the deployed contract system is publicly available.

    Why this result

    Direct public evidence — contract source, a deployment manifest or a published audit — supports the control.

    Weight 3 × multiplier 1 = 3 of 3 possible points.

    Assurance / Observability · Control assurance-audits

    Evidence (2)

    1. Evidence source
      Spearbit - Centrifuge Liquidity Pools security review, July 2024
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
    2. Evidence source
      Code4rena - Centrifuge competitive audit report, September 2023
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      HIGH
      View evidencecode4rena.com (opens in a new tab)
  • Ongoing monitoring, incident response or an independent controls assurance programme is evidenced.

    Why this result

    Published documentation supports the claim, without direct technical verification.

    Weight 2 × multiplier 0.75 = 1.5 of 2 possible points.

    Assurance / Observability · Control assurance-monitoring

    Evidence (2)

    1. Evidence source
      Centrifuge Liquidity Pools - Echidna and Medusa invariant-testing configuration run in the public CI workflow
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      MEDIUM
      View evidencegithub.com (opens in a new tab)
    2. Evidence source
      Centrifuge - protocol security reviews index
      Observation date
      21 Sep 2026
      Confidence
      MEDIUM
      View evidencedocs.centrifuge.io (opens in a new tab)

See something inaccurate?

Corrections are reviewed against the published methodology with a public source.

Report a correction

Important context

Scores measure publicly observable technical controls and documentation at the stated snapshot date. They are not smart-contract audits, credit ratings, investment recommendations, or assessments of an organization's complete security posture.